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1. Introduction This paper provides a new context for an established metaphysical debate
regarding the problem of persistence. Namely, how can it be said that one and the same
physical object persists through time while changing over time? I contend that a popular view
about persistence which maintains that objects persist by perduring—that is, by having
temporal parts—receives a particularly neat formulation in quantum mechanics due to the
existence of a formal analogy between time and space. I argue, however, that on closer
inspection this analogy fails due to a ‘no-go’ result which demonstrates that quantum systems
can’t be said to have temporal parts in the same way that they have spatial parts. Therefore, if
quantum mechanics describes persisting physical objects, then those objects cannot be said to
perdure.
This argument serves two aims. The first is to continue the recent tradition of addressing
the problem of persistence in the context of specific physical theories: Balashov (2010);
Gilmore (2008) consider special relativity; Butterfield (2005, 2006) considers classical
mechanics. The second aim is to provide a novel interpretation of the no-go result mentioned
above, which is well-known in the quantum foundations literature but rarely discussed by
philosophers of physics. The result is often phrased like this: There exists no time observable
canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian. This fact was first observed by Pauli in 1933, and
there are various proofs which arrive at essentially this conclusion. In contrast to Halvorson
(2010) I regard this result not as an argument against the existence of time but rather as an
argument that quantum objects (described by pure states) cannot have temporal parts.
I begin in Section 2 by introducing popular views of persistence and suggest my own
classification scheme that includes room for another view of persistence which I term
temporal holism. In Section 3 I examine some details of the quantum mechanical formalism
and suggest how to apply these views of persistence to realist ontology of persisting quantum
objects. I propose that a perduring quantum object has temporal parts in the same way as it
has spatial parts. In Section 4 I motivate and present a suitable account of the spatial parts of a
quantum object, which leads in Section 5 to a concrete suggestion for how such an object
could be said to have temporal parts. However, this suggestion is ruled out by the no-go result
mentioned above. I conclude by surveying some alternative accounts of temporal parts and
possible implications for the persistence debate.
2. The Metaphysics of Persisting Objects The debate over the question of how physical
objects persist has garnered much attention in recent years, and has come to be regarded as a
question of metaphysics in its own right, roughly orthogonal to debates in the metaphysics of
time. While the contemporary debate began as a straight fight between endurantism (the view
that persisting objects are individuals without temporal extension, wholly present at every
time they exist) and perdurantism (the view that persisting objects are temporally extended
individuals that persist by having temporal parts), following Sider’s (1997) intervention
another combatant—stage theory—was added to the mix. According to stage theory,
persisting objects are concatenations of appropriately related1 but distinct instantaneous
stages and thus it disagrees with both endurantism (which says that a persisting object is the
same individual at every instant) and perdurantism (which says that a persisting object is not
composed of many individual stages but is an individual having temporal parts).
These views of persistence can thus be classified according to how they divide a persisting
object up into individuals,2 and as to whether persisting objects can be said to have temporal
parts. Endurantism and perdurantism have in common the view that a persisting object is a
single individual: for both the endurantist and perdurantist, ‘the table at time t’ picks out the
same individual as ‘the table at time t′’ (where t 6= t′ are instants in the lifetime of the table).
However, the perdurantist considers ‘the table’ to be a four-dimensional entity that extends
through time and space, whereas the endurandist maintains that ‘the table’ is an entity with
only spatial extent. While the endurantist believes the (same) table is wholly present at every
time it exists, the perdurantist believes that only part of the table is wholly present at any one
time: the perdurantist believes that ordinary objects like tables are temporally extended and
have temporal parts.
Like perdurantism, stage theory maintains that persisting objects have temporal parts. As
a result they are sometimes referred to as varieties of a single view: four-dimensionalism.
However, according to stage theory ‘the table at time t’ refers to a particular instantaneous
stage rather than part of a temporally extended individual, and ‘the table at time t′’ refers to a
different instantaneous stage. For the stage theorist, a persisting object comprises a collection
1Hawley (2004) suggests that this is a transtemporal counterpart relation that resembles
David Lewis’ transworld counterpart relation.
2My use of the word ‘individual’ is intended to be interpretation neutral, serving to avoid
prejudicial use of the contentious term ‘persisting object.’
of these instantaneous stages, each of which has the attribute being a table, and none of which
has temporal extension. So the stage theorist believes that a persisting object like a table is in
fact composed of many individuals—momentarily existing table stages. While stage theory
and perdurantism agree that persisting objects have temporal extension, according to stage
theory the temporal parts of a persisting object are not mereological parts of a
four-dimensional entity but rather instantaneous stages (or collections of such stages).
Note that these three views are thus completely differentiated by their answers to two
questions: (a) Is a persisting object a single individual? (b) Does a persisting object have
temporal parts? There is, therefore, a forth view possible which answers yes to the first but no
to the second. I call this view temporal holism, the view that persisting objects are temporally
extended but mereologically simple individuals.3 I will argue that quantum mechanics makes
trouble for the perdurantist’s notion of a temporal part, which suggests that temporal holism is
compelled upon one who wishes to hang on to the idea that a persisting ‘quantum object’ is a
single temporally extended individual. The next section provides an account of quantum
objects, and how they may be said to persist.
3This discussion closely relates to the classification of Gilmore (2008). Question (b)
corresponds to his mereological perdurance / endurance distinction, while question (a) relates
to his locational perdurance / endurance distinction. However, the latter distinction relies on
the predicate ‘exactly occupies’ whose application to unitarily evolving quantum systems is
problematic (for reasons I discuss in Section 4). Regardless, I take temporal holism to capture
something of his idea of “a singly located and temporally extended but mereologically simple
electron” (1229).
3. Persisting Objects in Quantum Mechanics Quantum mechanics provides our best
theory of matter, and its empirical predictions have been startlingly accurate. That much is
uncontroversial. On the other hand, any attempt to assert exactly why it has proved so
successful, or precisely what it tells us about the nature of material objects involves taking
sides on disputes regarding its interpretation that have lasted over 80 years. To avoid taking
sides, I will proceed by specifying under what conditions one would be committed to
regarding the quantum state as describing a persisting material object. Nonetheless, I take it
that prima facie a realist metaphysician who takes tables (composed of collections of complex
organic molecules) to be persisting objects would be compelled to similarly regard, say, a
molecule of Buckminsterfullerene (C60) composed of sixty atoms of carbon, which has been
seen to display distinctly quantum behavior.
First, some details about the formalism of ordinary (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics.
As our concern is with spatio-temporal properties, we will consider systems with no internal
degrees of freedom (i.e. spinless particles). Therefore, the state space of the theory is provided
by the space of square integrable functions defined over all of space, that is,
infinite-dimensional (separable) complex Hilbert spaceH = L2(R3). The pure states |ψ〉 are
in one-to-one correspondence with the one-dimensional subspaces ofH or, equivalently, the
set of independent unit vectors which individually span those subspaces. SinceH is a vector
space, linear combinations of pure states are also pure states (this is the superposition
principle). In what follows I will only consider pure states.
The first interpretative posit I require is realism, the claim that real physical systems are
authentically described by quantum mechanical states. The next posit I require is
completeness, the claim that a pure state provides a complete description of an individual
quantum system which leaves nothing out (i.e. no hidden variables). So far we would be
justified in claiming that the quantum state describes a physical object. But what about
persisting objects? For that we require some facts about quantum dynamics, which takes two
forms: the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures.
In the Schro¨dinger picture, the history of a system is given by a family of states |ψ(t)〉,
parameterized by t ∈ R. Once the state of the system at a particular time is given, the entire
family is determined according to the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation in terms of a
one-parameter (strongly continuous) group of unitary operators Ut = e−iHt, where H is the
Hamiltonian of the system. If a pure state |ψ(0)〉 describes a physical object which exists at
time t = 0, then the states |ψ(t)〉 describe the lifetime of a persisting object which exists at
each time t in the state |ψ(t)〉. The infamous measurement problem arises when we consider
the relation of the unitary dynamics of the state to the results of laboratory observations. To
avoid having to address this issue, I will consider only systems undergoing unitary evolution,
which corresponds to the assumption that quantum objects are isolated.
In the Heisenberg picture, the observables change with time rather than the state of the
system. The time dependence of a (Schro¨dinger picture) observable A (a self-adjoint operator
onH) is again given in terms of the unitary group Ut. The corresponding Heisenberg picture
observable is A(t) = U †tAUt and in the Heisenberg picture the state of the system at all times
is |ψ〉. If |ψ(t)〉 = Ut|ψ〉 then the two pictures are empirically equivalent, returning the same
expectation values 〈A〉 = 〈ψt|A|ψt〉 = 〈ψ|U †tAUt|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|A(t)|ψ〉. However, they are not
necessarily equivalent with respect to metaphysics: the states |ψ(t)〉 appear suited to describe
individuals existing at a single instant whereas |ψ〉 appears to describe an individual with
temporal extension, existing at many times.
Interpreted in this way, the difference between the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures
corresponds precisely to the distinction I drew between (respectively) endurantism and stage
theory on the one hand, and perdurantism and temporal holism on the other. According to an
endurantist interpretation, the Schro¨dinger picture states |ψ(t)〉 are distinct states of a single
individual whose identity through time transcends the assignment of differing properties at
different times. Arguably this is the interpretation which best fits the common understanding
of time evolution as describing the changing state of a system whose identity through time is
assumed. This is consistent with endurantism’s claim to provide an account of our intuitive
grasp of persistence.
However, if we take the view instead that each state |ψ(t)〉 corresponds to a distinct
quantum object then it appears that the Schro¨dinger picture family of states describes a series
of distinct instantaneously existing quantum objects related by the unitary group Ut.4 This
closely resembles stage theory. If the instantaneous stages correspond to the Schro¨dinger
picture states |ψ(t)〉, then the temporal parts of a persisting quantum object correspond to sets
of those states i.e. according to stage theory the temporal part extending from t1 to t2 is the
collection of instantaneous stages described by the set of states {|ψ(t)〉 : t ∈ [t1, t2]}.
In contrast, the Heisenberg picture describes a single quantum object |ψ〉 which exists at
many times. According to perdurantism, |ψ〉 is an object which persists by having temporal
parts. Temporal holism would amount to the denial of the perdurantist’s claim that persisting
objects have temporal parts. For this debate to make sense, we require a notion of what it is
for |ψ〉 to have temporal parts. In order to find one, I return to the motivation for the claim that
persisting objects have temporal parts, which is a strong analogy between the way an object
extends in time and space—between temporal parts and spatial parts.
Perdurance corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of it is here
and part of it is there, and no part is wholly present at two different places. (Lewis
4More precisely, they will be distinct if Ut is non-periodic.
1986, 202)
As I see it, the heart of four-dimensionalism is the claim that the part-whole
relation behaves with respect to time analogously to how it behaves with respect
to space. (Sider 1997, 204)
Thus a suitable account of what is is for a quantum object |ψ〉 to have temporal parts will
closely resemble a satisfactory account of how a quantum object may be said to have spatial
parts. In the following section I provide just such an account.
4. Parts and Spatial Parts It is well known that there are severe difficulties in regarding the
wavefunction ψ(x) as describing ‘the way that a quantum object persists through space.’ This
is because ψ(x) (the position representation of the vector |ψ〉) is not a function of
three-dimensional space but of 3N -dimensional configuration space, so the x in the argument
only corresponds to physical space in the special case of a single particle. This problem is not
insurmountable, however, since there is nonetheless a way of describing |ψ〉 as a mereological
sum of component quantum objects, each of which is confined to a particular region of space.
In order to do so, we require a suitable part-whole relation. I contend that such a relation
may be found by considering the subspaces ofH, or equivalently the projections onto those
subspaces. According to classical mereology, the relation of parthood is (minimally) reflexive
(everything is part of itself), transitive (if p is part of q and q is part of r then p is part of r) and
antisymmetric (no two distinct things can be part of each other). As is well known, the
subspaces of a vector space labeled A,B,C . . . are partially ordered by the relation of
inclusion, which is reflexive (A ⊆ A), transitive (if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ C then A ⊆ C) and
antisymmetric (if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A then A = B).
I claim that in quantum theory the spatial parts of a quantum object |ψ〉 may be given in
terms of the subspaces ofH associated with the spectral decomposition of the position
observable Q. The reason this provides a suitable decomposition into spatial parts is that Q
thus serves to uniquely associate every region of space ∆ with a projection operator P∆ onH
such that disjoint regions of space are assigned to mutually orthogonal subspaces.5 By
projecting a vector state |ψ〉 onto the subspace associated with ∆ one obtains a state
P∆|ψ〉 = |ψ∆〉 which may be interpreted as describing a quantum object wholly located
within ∆, related to |ψ〉 as part of a whole. I now proceed to fill in some details of this
account.
Quantum mechanical observables such as position are associated with self-adjoint
operators (position in three-dimensional space is associated with three operators Qx, Qy, Qz).
The set of self-adjoint operators onH is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of
Projection Valued Measures (PVMs) on B(R), the Borel subsets of R.6 Such a PVM is an
assignment of projections onH to the measurable subsets ∆ ⊂ B(R) such that the map
∆ 7→ P∆ has the properties: 1. PR = I (normalization), and 2. P⋃n ∆n =∑n P∆n
(σ-additivity) (where ∆n ⊂ B(R) is a sequence of mutually disjoint subsets and convergence
is in the weak operator topology).
The association of projections with spatial regions ∆ through the position observable
satisfies the quantum mechanical parthood relation I articulated above in a way that makes it
quite plausible that they provide a suitable notion of spatial parts. Due to 2. the relation of
5For a general proof that this is always the case in non-relativistic quantum mechanics see
(Wightman 1962).
6This is in effect a statement of the spectral theorem. See, for example, (Teschl 2009,
Thm. 3.7).
subspace inclusion provided by the P∆ corresponds precisely to the corresponding relation of
regions of space. For example, if ∆′ is a region of space that lies within ∆ then P∆′ projects
onto a subspace that lies within the subspace that P∆ projects onto, and, since the P∆ are
projections, 2. also entails that disjoint regions of space are associated with mutually
orthogonal subspaces.
P∆ is commonly known as a localization system, in the sense that performing a
measurement of a projection P∆ has the possible outcomes {0, 1}: either the system is located
in ∆ or the system is not located in ∆, with probabilities supplied by the Born rule. These
possibilities are mutually exclusive in that PR/∆ = I− P∆ (2.) and so a system may be said to
be ‘wholly located in ∆ at t’ on the condition that P∆|ψ∆(t)〉 = |ψ∆(t)〉, in which case we
say that |ψ∆(t)〉 is an eigenstate of P∆ at time t. Since in general the system will not be in an
eigenstate of any projection P∆ we can’t say that it located anywhere in particular but rather
that it is localizable.
Another characteristic of the PVM P∆ which justifies the contention that it provides an
assignment of spatial parts is that this assignment covaries with spatial translations
U †aP∆Ua = P∆−a, where Ua = e
−iPa is the one-parameter unitary group of spatial translations
in the direction of a generated by the (total) momentum P . Roughly, this is a consequence of
the fact that Q and P are canonically conjugate, [Q,P ] = i~. Viewing these transformations
passively, as moving the origin of the spatial co-ordinates by a, P∆−a|ψ〉 in the new
co-ordinates denotes the same part as P∆|ψ〉 = |ψ∆〉 in the old. Viewed actively, covariance
assures us that the part Ua|ψ∆〉 is just the part |ψ∆〉 moved to a new location ∆ + a since
P∆+aUa|ψ∆〉 = Ua|ψ∆〉.
According to my definition, then, the spatial part of |ψ(t)〉 located in ∆ is the eigenstate of
P∆ obtained by projection of |ψ〉 i.e. given by the state P∆|ψ(t)〉. These spatial parts are thus
defined instantaneously: at each instant P∆ supplies an assignment of parts to spatial regions.
But note that this discussion has taken place in the Schro¨dinger picture. In the Heisenberg
picture the projections P∆(t) are time indexed and we have
P∆(t)|ψ∆〉 = U †t P∆Ut|ψ∆〉 = |ψ∆〉. Thus the Heisenberg picture projections pick out
subspaces that are invariant under time translations, whereas the Schro¨dinger picture
subspaces covary with time translations. This aspect might be thought of as a boon for the
perdurantist since it (apparently) restores a symmetry between temporal and spatial parts by
defining spatial parts directly in terms of spatial regions (Butterfield 1985). However, I argue
in the next section that quantum mechanics instead breaks this symmetry by failing to allow
an analogous notion of temporal parts.
5. (No) Temporal Parts I proposed that the spatial parts of a quantum object |ψ〉 are the
projections onto the subspaces associated with spatial regions by a localization scheme P∆.
The states |ψ∆〉 = P∆|ψ〉 deserve to be regarded as spatial parts since |ψ∆〉 describes a
quantum object wholly located in region ∆ which bears the parthood relation to |ψ〉. By
analogy, then, the temporal part wholly present during the time interval I = [t1, t2] would be a
quantum object PI |ψI〉 which can be interpreted as being present only at times t ∈ [t1, t2], and
which bears the relation of parthood to |ψ〉.
The spatial parts |ψ∆〉 may be regarded as wholly located in ∆ since they are eigenstates
of P∆, a PVM that associates regions of space with subspaces ofH. Thus the temporal parts
of |ψ〉 would be quantum objects |ψI〉 that are eigenstates of PI , a projection associated with
the interval I , with all the PI together forming a PVM. This requirement ensures that the
subspaces associated with disjoint intervals of time are mutually orthogonal so that |ψI〉 may
be interpreted as an object present during I but at no other times.
The interpretative difficulty with such a state |ψI〉 is that, since PJ |ψI〉 = 0 for disjoint
I, J , it appears be a state that violates probability conservation (if this is interpreted literally
as saying that the system does not exist at other times). However, just as the existence the
PVM P∆ (the spectral decomposition associated with position) does not imply the existence
of quantum mechanical systems that persist in an eigenstate of some P∆, the existence of PI
(the spectral decomposition associated with time) need not imply that any systems actually
exist in such states. Specifically, just as the existence of P∆ is equivalent to the existence of a
‘position basis’ (a resolution of the identity) in which a vector state may be written 〈x|ψ〉, the
existence of PI is equivalent to the existence of a ‘time basis’ in which the same vector may
be written 〈t|ψ〉.
However, there is a further requirement that one should demand in order to view PI as
providing an assignment of temporal parts: as the spatial parts |ψ∆〉 were stable under spatial
translations, so too should the temporal parts |ψI〉 be stable under temporal translations. Thus
PI needs to covary with time shifts so that U
†
t PIUt = PI−t. The reasons for doing so are as
before: the definition of a temporal part should not depend on a particular co-ordinatization of
the time axis, and a temporal part wholly present during I when shifted in time by t should be
identical with the part wholly present during I + t.
Unfortunately for the would-be quantum perdurantist, it turns out that these two
requirements are in conflict with the restriction on physical Hamiltonians known as the
spectral condition, which permits only Hamiltonian operators with a spectrum bounded from
below i.e. only systems whose energy cannot decrease without bound. The usual argument for
this requirement is that to do otherwise would allow for systems which may transfer energy to
their surroundings indefinitely. While it is true that all systems we know obey the spectral
condition (e.g. a free particle or harmonic oscillator), we could also view it as a principle of
the theory on par with (say) the first law of thermodynamics.
Now, it is a theorem that if (i) PI is a PVM, (ii) U
†
t PIUt = PI−t, and (iii) Ut is a unitary
group generated by a self-adjoint operator H whose spectrum is bounded from below, then
PI = 0 for all I .7 This result is often referred to as Pauli’s theorem, after a argument that
appeared in a footnote of Pauli’s handbook article of 1933 which sought to establish that there
can be no self-adjoint operator T canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian H . One can see by
the aforementioned correspondence of PVMs with self-adjoint operators that this theorem has
that implication, although there is some ambiguity in the phrase ‘canonically conjugate’.8
I have argued that we should view requirements (i) and (ii) as necessary for the states
PI |ψ〉 to be temporal parts of |ψ〉. Since this theorem establishes that PI |ψ〉 = 0 (the zero
vector) for all I and all |ψ〉, it serves as a reductio of the perdurantist’s claim that |ψ〉 persists
through time by having temporal parts in the same way as it persists through space by having
spatial parts. In other words, no quantum object has temporal parts.
How might the perdurantist respond? One could attempt to hijack the stage theorists
definition of a temporal part as the set of states {|ψt〉 : t ∈ [t1, t2]} by defining projections as
integrals over one-dimensional projectors onto those states,
P τI =
∫ t2
t1
dt|ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)|.
These projections covary since U †t PI−tUt = P τI but they do not project onto orthogonal states.
But in the absence of an appropriate parthood relation it is not clear that the state P τI |ψ〉 that
results can be regarded as a temporal part of |ψ〉. Furthermore, this state combines the
Heisenberg picture and Schrod¨inger picture in an uncomfortable way. While with appropriate
7See Srinivas and Vijayalakshmi (1981, Theorem 1) or Halvorson (2010).
8See Galapon (2002) for a critique of Pauli’s argument along these lines.
normalization the various projectors P τI may sum to unity, the complex amplitudes 〈ψ(t)|ψ〉
that result depend directly on the value of t since by definition |ψ〉 = |ψ(0)〉.9
Another way to relax condition (i) while holding onto (ii) involves the use of Positive
Operator Valued Measures (POVMs) rather than PVMs. While a time PVM assigns a
projection operator PI to a temporal interval I , a time POVM would provide an assignment of
positive operators EI ≥ 0 to temporal intervals I which nonetheless obey conditions 1. and 2.
of the previous section. While the quantum objects EI |ψ〉 thus behave somewhat like
temporal parts without being assigned to orthogonal subspaces, the interpretation of these
parts as being wholly present during I is problematic. It seems to me that rather than
providing an account of temporal parts consistent with perdurantism, this is better understood
as an articulation of temporal holism i.e. as an account of how an assignment of properties to
times can be consistent with the denial that there exist temporal parts.
6. Conclusion This attempt to transpose the traditional debate regarding the metaphysics of
persistence into the formalism of quantum mechanics has had some interesting outcomes.
First, it was suggested that there is another possible view of persistence which has received
little attention: temporal holism, the view that persisting objects are four-dimensional
individuals without temporal parts. Second, I provided an account of what it would be for a
quantum object to have spatial parts, and argued for an analogous account of temporal parts.
Finally I showed that this account, although attractive, is actually ruled out by quantum
9A more promising alternative for the perduranist involves regarding the true home of a
persisting quantum object not asH but rather the direct sum of temporally indexed Hilbert
spacesHt, each spanned by the complete set of instantaneous Schro¨dinger picture states
{|ψ(t)〉 : |ψ〉 ∈ H}, with the projectors P τI acting on this ‘larger’ Hilbert space.
mechanics and therefore persisting quantum objects do not have temporal parts, and so cannot
be said to perdure.
To the extent that we have reason to think that all persisting objects are quantum objects,
this provides reason to doubt that perdurantism is true.10 Since the application of stage theory
and endurantism to persisting objects in quantum mechanics was relatively unproblematic,
this confers some support to these views instead. However, I have not considered here
relativistic quantum mechanics, which introduces problems for the Schro¨dinger picture on
which these views rely.11 Reasons to discount the Schro¨dinger picture are thus reasons to
discount stage theory and endurantism, and so if relativistic quantum mechanics were to
compel the adoption of the Heisenberg picture for independent reasons then it seems that
temporal holism would win out as the last view standing. This would be a surprising victory
for a view of persistence that has received almost no attention in the metaphysics literature.
Detailed consideration of the complications introduced by relativity (including the problem of
making contact with the existing relativistic persistence debate) will, however, have to await
further investigation.
10Arguably, classical persisting objects are best thought of as “patterns that emerge from an
ubiquitous, continuous, and very efficient process of decoherence.” Butterfield (2006, 41).
Decoherence refers to the process by which interactions between an ‘object’ system (e.g. a
dust particle) and its environment serve to pick out a dynamically ‘preferred’ basis according
to which the object system is approximately diagonalized. My argument concerns the basis
independent description of the entire system of object and environment.
11In particular, Rovelli (2004) advocates the Heisenberg picture as providing a
relativistically invariant notion of the quantum state, a view that he traces back to Dirac.
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